Ten-Day War

The border station at Holmec was the location of an alleged war crime perpetrated by TO forces, filmed by the Austrian public broadcasting station ORF. Video footage shows a small group of JNA soldiers standing or walking slowly with raised hands, holding up a white sheet in an apparent attempt to surrender. Moments later, gunfire is heard and the soldiers fall/jump to the ground. Neither the origin of the gunfire nor its exact effect are clearly visible on the video segment. Slovene officials maintain that the JNA soldiers jumped for cover and were not hit, and that the matter was thoroughly investigated years ago. However, the incident sparked renewed public debate after the footage was shown on Serbian TV station B92 in 2006, with many claiming that the soldiers were shot and killed by TO troops and that Slovenia is trying to cover up the affair. ^[9]^[10]^[11] The fate of the JNA soldiers identified on the footage has been tracked, however, and they were all reported alive 15 years after the conflict.^[12]

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Strategic aspects of the war

The actions of Slovenia's forces were largely dictated by the military strategy devised some months before and were tightly integrated with an equally detailed media management plan. An international media centre was established prior to the outbreak of conflict with Jelko Kacin designated to act as information minister and Slovenia's public face to the world. The Slovenian government successfully presented the conflict as a case of a "David versus Goliath" struggle between an emerging democracy and an authoritarian communist state, and the columns of Yugoslav tanks inevitably brought to mind the events of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 only two years earlier. This won considerable international sympathy and favourable media coverage for the Slovenian cause.

The Slovenians had the advantage of far superior morale, compared to their adversaries in the Yugoslav army. Many of the Yugoslav soldiers apparently did not realise they were taking part in a real military operation, rather than an exercise, until they came under attack. The officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins and in many cases ideologically committed to Yugoslav unity. The rank and file troops however were conscripts, who had no interest in fighting Slovenes. Of the soldiers of the 5th Military District, which was in action in Slovenia, in 1990 30% were Albanians, 20% Croats, 10% Bosniaks, 15 to 20% Serbs and Montenegrins, and 8% Slovenes.^[13]

The Slovenian strategy relied on a number of risky gambles. Slovenia could not have resisted the JNA for long had the full weight of the federal army been brought into action, but its leaders had gambled on the JNA leadership's unwillingness to risk mass civilian casualties. In the diplomatic arena, the Slovenian government had gambled that the international community would step in to press the Yugoslavs to desist — again, a supposition in which they were proved correct. The Slovenians were also well aware that the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević was not particularly concerned about Slovenia's independence, given the lack of any significant Serbian minority in the country. On 30 June, Defence Minister General Kadijević suggested to the Yugoslav federal presidency a massive attack on Slovenia to break down the unexpectedly heavy resistance. But the Serb representative, Borisav Jović, shocked the military establishment by declaring that Serbia did not support further military action against Slovenia.^[14] Serbia was at this point more concerned with the situation in Croatia, even before the war had ended, JNA troops were already repositioning themselves for the imminent war in Croatia.

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Consequences of the war

For Slovenia, the war marked the decisive break with Yugoslavia. It was officially recognised by all the European Community member states on 15 January 1992 and joined the United Nations on 22 May, along with the other post-Yugoslav states.

With Croatia as a buffer between it and Serbia, Slovenia was able to maintain its independence and its position as the most stable and prosperous of the former Yugoslav republics and joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

The war led to a series of major shifts on the Yugoslav side. The JNA rapidly lost virtually all of its Slovenian and Croat personnel, becoming an almost entirely Serbian and Montenegrian force. Its poor performance in Slovenia and later in Croatia discredited its leadership — Kadijević resigned as defense minister in January 1992, and Adžić was forced into medical retirement shortly afterwards. The idea of preserving a unitary Yugoslavia had to be abandoned after the defeat in Slovenia and was replaced by Milošević's conception of "all Serbs in one state" (widely characterized as "Greater Serbia").

Croatia did not become directly involved in the war even though they declared independence on the same day as Slovenia, 25 June 1991. The Slovenian and Croatian government were urged by the European Commission to place a three-month moratorium on the decision of independence. Slovenia and Croatia thereby agreed to freeze their declaration of independence for a period of three months, hoping to calm tensions. Slovenia used the period to consolidate its institutions, deliver some of the most urgent economic reforms and prepare for the international recognition of the country.

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Notes

^ Gow, James & Carmichael, Cathie. Slovenia and the Slovenes, pp. 174–178. C. Hurst, London, 1999.
^ Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 58 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002
^ Allcock, John B. et al. Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, p. 274. ABC-CLIO, Denver, 1998
^ Mesić, Stjepan. "The Road to War", in The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–1995, ed. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić. Frank Cass, London, 2001
^ Quoted in Balkan Battlegrounds, ibid.
^ Quoted in Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 59
^ Silber, Laura & Little, Allan. The Death of Yugoslavia. Penguin, London, 1995
^ Quoted in Balkan Battlegrounds, p. 64
^ Serb Official Accuses Slovenia Troops Of War Crimes, 2006-04-08 Associated Press Report
^ "Slovenia denies Serbian claims of independence war crimes", 2006-04-06 Slovenian News Agency STA Report
^ "Janša Protests to Koštunica over Statements on Holmec" 2006-04-06 BETA News Agency Report)
^ "Belgrade Says Holmec Footage Victims Alive", 2006-04-26 Slovenian News Agency STA Report - dead link 2008/04/07
^ Meier, Viktor. Yugoslavia — A History of its Demise. Routledge, London, 1999
^ Vasić, Miloš. "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies", in Yugoslavia and After — A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, ed. David A. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda. Longman, London, 1996

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Bibliography

Allcock, John B. et al. Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. ABC-CLIO, Denver, 1998
Gow, James & Carmichael, Cathie. Slovenia and the Slovenes. C. Hurst, London, 1999
Gow, James. The Serbian Project and its Adversaries. C. Hurst, London, 2003
The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–1995, ed. Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić. Frank Cass, London, 2001
Svajncer, Brigadier Janez J. "War for Slovenia 1991", Slovenska vojska, May 2001.