Greco-Italian War
The stalemate continued, despite local actions, as both enemies were not strong enough to launch a major attack. Despite their gains, however, the Greeks were in a precarious position, as they had virtually stripped their northern frontier of weapons and men in order to sustain the Albanian front, and were too weak to resist a possible German attack via Bulgaria.
The Italians, on the other hand, wishing to achieve a success in the Albanian front before the impending German intervention, gathered their forces to launch a new offensive, codenamed "Primavera" (Spring). They assembled 17 divisions opposite the Greeks' 13, and, under Mussolini's personal supervision, launched a determined attack against the Klisura Pass. The assault lasted from March 9 to March 20, but failed to dislocate the Greeks and obtained only small conquests like Himare, the area of Mali Harza and mount Trebescini near Berat.[6] From that moment until the German attack on April 6, the stalemate continued, with operations on both sides scaled down.
In anticipation of the German attack, the British and some Greeks urged a withdrawal of the Army of Epirus, so as to spare badly needed troops and equipment for the repulsion of the Germans. However, national sentiment forbade the abandoning of so hard-won positions, overriding military logic, and retreat in the face of the 'defeated' Italians was deemed disgraceful. Therefore the bulk of the Greek Army (fifteen divisions) was left deep in Albania, while the German attack approached. General Wilson derided this reluctance as "the fetishistic doctrine that not a yard of ground should be yielded to the Italians" and so only six of the twenty one Greek divisions were left to fight the German attack[26].
From April 6 the Italians recommenced their offensive in Albania in connection with the German Operation Marita. The initial attacks made little progress, but on April 12, the Greek High Command, alarmed by the rapid progress of the German invasion, ordered a withdrawal from Albania. The Italian 9th Army took Korçë on April 14, followed by Ersekë three days later. On April 19 the Italians occupied the Greek shores of Lake Prespa and on April 22 the 4th Bersaglieri Regiment reached the bridge of the border village Perati, crossing into Greek territory the next day.
In the meantime, the Greek Army of Epirus was cut off in April 18, when elements of the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorized brigade captured the Metsovon Pass after overcoming local Greek resistance. The next day, Ioannina fell to the Germans, completing the isolation of the Greek Army. Aware of the hopelessness of his situation, Lt. General Tsolakoglou, in agreement with several other generals but without authorization from Papagos, relieved Army commander Lt. General Pitsikas and offered the Army's surrender to Sepp Dietrich on April 20, primarily to avoid the perceived dishonour of surrendering to the Italians.[27] The terms of surrender were deemed honourable, as the Greek Army would not be taken prisoner, and officers were allowed to retain their sidearms. Mussolini, however, was enraged by this unilateral surrender, and after many protests to Hitler, the surrender ceremony was repeated on April 23 to include Italian representatives.
On April 24 the Italian troops joined up with the German forces attacking the Attica area near Athens, while the defeated British forces started their evacuation and Bulgaria invaded northern Greek territory around Xanthi. On May 3, after the final conquest of Crete, an imposing German-Italian parade in Athens celebrated the Axis victory. It was after the victory in Greece (and Yugoslavia) that Mussolini started to talk and boast in his propaganda about the Italian Mare Nostrum.
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Naval operations
At the outbreak of hostilities, the Royal Hellenic Navy was composed of the old cruiser Averof, 10 destroyers (4 old Theria class, 4 relatively modern Dardo class and 2 new Greyhound class), several torpedo boats and 6 old submarines. Faced with the formidable Regia Marina, its role was primarily limited to patrol and convoy escort duties in the Aegean Sea. This was essential both for the completion of the Army's mobilization, but also for the overall resupply of the country, the convoy routes being threatened by Italian aircraft and submarines operating from the Dodecanese Islands.
Nevertheless, the Greek ships also carried out limited offensive operations against Italian shipping in the Strait of Otranto. The destroyers carried out three bold but fruitless night-time raids (14-15 November 1940, 15-16 December 1940 and 4-5 January 1941). The main successes came from the submarines, which managed to sink some Italian transports. On the Italian side, although the Regia Marina suffered severe losses in capital ships from the Royal Navy during the Taranto raid, Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to operate covering the convoys between Italy and Albania. Also, on November 28, an Italian squadron bombarded Corfu, while on December 18 and March 4, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania.
From January 1941, the RHN's main task was the escort of convoys to and from Alexandria, in cooperation with the British Royal Navy. As the transportation of the British Expeditionary Corps began in early March, the Italian Fleet decided to sortie against them. Well informed by ULTRA intercepts, the British fleet intercepted and decisively defeated the Italians at the Battle of Cape Matapan on March 28.
With the start of the German offensive on April 6, the situation changed rapidly. German control of the air caused heavy casualties to the Greek and British navies, and the occupation of the mainland and later Crete by the Wehrmacht signaled the end of Allied surface operations in Greek waters until the Dodecanese Campaign of 1943.
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Aftermath
With the fall of Crete in May 1941, all of Greece was under the complete control of the Axis. For the next 3 years it would endure a harsh joint occupation by Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. In the occupied country, an effective Resistance network was established, which achieved the liberation of much of the mountainous mainland by 1944. At the same time, Greek troops and ships were continuing the fight along the British in North Africa and, eventually, in Italy itself. With the German withdrawal from the Balkans in October-November 1944, Greece, with the exception of some isolated German garrisons in the islands, was liberated. Soon however, the country would be engulfed by a new conflict, the Greek Civil War.
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Effects on World War II
Despite the ultimate triumph of the Axis powers in the Greek campaign, the Greek resistance to the Italian invasion, according to several historians, greatly affected the course of the Second World War. More specifically, it has been argued that the need for a German intervention in the Balkans delayed Operation Barbarossa, and caused losses, especially in aircraft and paratroopers during the airborne invasion of Crete, which affected its outcome. Adolf Hitler, in conversation with Leni Riefenstahl, would bitterly say that "if the Italians hadn't attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different course. We could have anticipated the Russian cold by weeks and conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have been no Stalingrad".[28] Furthermore, the need to occupy the country, suppress the partisans and defend it against Allied actions, tied down several German and Italian divisions during the course of the war. However, other historians such as Antony Beevor claim that it was not Greek resistance that delayed the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, but instead the slow construction of airfields in Eastern Europe.[29]
At the same time, however, the Greek resistance ultimately necessitated an Allied intervention. The decision to send British forces into Greece was primarily motivated by political considerations, and is considered in hindsight, in the words of General Alan Brooke, "a definite strategic blunder", as it diverted forces from the Middle East, at a very critical stage, to Greece. These forces in the event proved insufficient to halt the German invasion of Greece, but could have played a decisive role in the North African Campaign, bringing it to a victorious conclusion much sooner.
| Hitler calls Mussolini on the phone: "Benito aren't you in Athens yet?" "I can't hear you Adolf." "I said aren't you in Athens yet?" "I can't hear you. You must be ringing from a long way off, presumably London." |
| Joke circulating in Occupied France, winter 1940-41[30] |
Also important was the moral example, set in a time when only the British Empire resisted the Axis Powers, of a small country fighting off the supposedly mighty Fascist Italy, something reflected in the exuberant praise the Greek struggle received at the time. Most prominent is the quote of Winston Churchill:
| “ | Hence we will not say that Greeks fight like heroes, but that heroes fight like Greeks.[31] | ” |
French general Charles de Gaulle was among those who praised the fierceness of the Greek resistance. In an official notice released to coincide with the Greek national celebration of the Day of Independence (25 March), De Gaulle expressed his admiration for the heroic Greek resistance:
| “ | In the name of the captured yet still alive French people, France wants to send her greetings to the Greek people who are fighting for their freedom. The 25th of March, 1941 finds Greece in the peak of their heroic struggle and in the top of their glory. Since the battle of Salamis, Greece had not achieved the greatness and the glory which today holds.[32] | ” |
Greece's siding with the Allies also contributed to its annexation of the Italian-occupied but Greek-populated Dodecanese islands at the conclusion of World War II, in 1947.
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The Greco-Italian War remembered
The 1940 war, popularly referred to as the Épos toú Saránda (Greek: Έπος του Σαράντα, i.e. Epic of '40) in Greece, and the resistance of the Greeks to the Axis Powers, is celebrated to this day in Greece every year. October 28, the day of Ioannis Metaxas' rejection of the Italian ultimatum, is a day of national celebration in Greece, named Okhi Day (Greek for "Day of No"). A military parade takes place in Salonica (to coincide with the city's anniversary of liberation during the First Balkan War and the feast of its patron saint, St. Demetrius) and student parades in Athens and other cities. For several days, many buildings in Greece, public or private, displays the Greek flag. In the days preceding the anniversary, television and radio often feature historical films and documentaries about 1940, or broadcast Greek patriotic songs, especially those of Sophia Vembo, a singer whose songs gained immense popularity during the war. It serves also as a day of remembrance for the "dark years" of the Axis Occupation of Greece (1941-1944).
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Military insights gained from the War
The poor performance of the Italian forces in the Albanian campaign can be blamed on many things, all of them symptomatic of the problems plaguing the Italian military during World War II. General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, in his memoirs, attributes the failure of the campaign mainly to poor organization, personal agendas, corruption and lack of cooperation among the top ranks of Italy's Armed Forces. Prasca compared the stubborn Greek resistance in Epirus with that of the Turks in the Dardanelles in World War I.[33] At the same time, however, Prasca is considered one of those mainly responsible for underestimating the strength of the Greek Army, making inadequate plans and leading the Italian army to its blunder in the mountains of Epirus.[34] The Italian forces certainly faced tactical problems, being weaker in infantry, with only two regiments per division[35]. However the Italians were stronger in artillery and mortars than the Greeks, and enjoyed absolute superiority in air forces, which they did not manage to exploit properly. Poor motivation, as opposed to the Greeks, and the rough terrain of Epirus, which favoured the Greek defence, also played a role in the outcome.
However, the Italians failed primarily at a strategic level, i.e. at the level of Mussolini and the High Command. Barely a month before the invasion of Greece, on October 1, Mussolini ordered the demobilization of half the Italian army, a measure accepted by the General Staff, although General Mario Roatta warned that much of the army would become unserviceable for many months.[36] In addition, the persistent underestimation of Greek preparedness doomed the campaign to failure from the start. As the Italian historian Renzo De Felice wrote: "The military superiority (numerical and technical) was always, in the first months of the war, on the side of the Greeks. The Greeks were well informed of all the Italian intentions and had called to the arms nearly 350000 men by the first days of Νovember.[citation needed] The Italians had only eight divisions in Albania (and two of these were facing the Yugoslavian Army) in October 1940, while the Greeks had initially 14 divisions well trained to the fight in their mountainous terrain. The Greek Army spent all available resources to attain their victorious defense and counterattack; as a consequence, the German attack ("Operation Marita") found a limited resistance from the exhausted Greeks in April 1941"[37] Another notable failure of the Italian offense is the lack of any attack on the Ionian Islands or Crete, which were obvious and relatively undefended targets, and could have provided Italy with strong forward naval and air bases.
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See also
- Military history of Italy during World War II
- Military history of Greece during World War II
- Italian invasion of Albania
- Operation Alpenveilchen
- Invasion of Yugoslavia
- Battle of Greece
- Battle of Crete
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Sources
- Bauer, Eddy; Young, Peter (general editor) [1979] (2000). The History of World War II, Revised edition, London, UK: Orbis Publishing. ISBN 1-85605-552-3.
- Beevor, Antony (1992). Crete: The Battle and the Resistance. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-016787-0.
- Buell, Hal. (2002). World War II, Album & Chronicle. New York: Tess Press. ISBN 1-57912-271-X.
- Cervi, Mario (1972). The Hollow Legions. London: Chatto and Windus. ISBN 0-7011-1351-0.
- Ciano, Count Galeazzo (1947). The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, Mudderidge Ed. London
- De Felice, Renzo (1990). Mussolini l'Alleato: Italia in guerra 1940-1943. Torino: Rizzoli Ed..
- Hellenic Army General Staff (1997). An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941 (Land Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions. OCLC 45409635.
- Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303573-8.
- Knox, MacGregor (2000). Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-43. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79047-6.
- La Campagna di Grecia, Italian official history (in Italian), 1980.
- Lamb, Richard (1998). Mussolini as Diplomat. London: John Murray Publishers. ISBN 088064244-0
- Mack Smith, Denis (1976). Mussolini's Roman Empire Fromm Ed. London (1949).
- Papagos, Alexandros (1949). The Battle of Greece 1940–1941 Athens: J.M. Scazikis “Alpha”, editions. ASIN B0007J4DRU.
- Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti (1946). Io Ho Aggredito La Grecia, Rizzoli.
- Rodogno, Davide (2006). Fascism's European Empire: Italian Occupation During the Second World War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521845151.
- The Greek Army in World War II, A six volume series, Greek official history (in Greek).
- Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts; Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-646-4.
[
References
- ^ a b c d Hellenic Air Force Historyaccessed March 25, 2008
- ^ a b Rodogno (2006), p.30
- ^ David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (2002), p.374. ISBN 1-872197-10-8
- ^ Cervi (1972), p.293
- ^ Rodogno (2006), p.446
- ^ a b Buell (2002), p. 76
- ^ Ciano (1947),[page # needed]
- ^ Knox (2000), p. 79
- ^ Buell (2002), p. 52
- ^ a b Buell (2002), p. 54
- ^ Hadjipateras, C.N., Greece 1940-41 Eyewitnessed, (Efstathiadis Group, 1996) ISBN 9602265337
- ^ Goulis and Maïdis, Ο Δεύτερος Παγκόσμιος Πόλεμος (The Second World War), (in Greek) (Filologiki G. Bibi, 1967)
- ^ Bauer (2000) p. 99
- ^ Bauer (2000) p. 99
- ^ Walker (2003), pp.22-23
- ^ Italian Army OrBat, at Comando Supremo
- ^ Buell (2002), p. 37
- ^ Walker (2003), pp.22-23
- ^ Knox (2000), p.80
- ^ Bauer (2000), p.105
- ^ Walker (2003), p.28
- ^ Bauer (2000), p.105
- ^ "Zeto Hellas", TIME magazine, Monday, December 02, 1940. Retrieved on 2008-03-30.
- ^ Buell (2002), p. 75
- ^ Bauer (2000), p.106
- ^ De Felice (1990), p. 125
- ^ Keegan, p. 157
- ^ Leni Riefenstahl, Leni Riefenstahl: A Memoir. (Picador New York, USA. 1987) p. 295 ISBN 0-312-11926-7
- ^ Beevor, p. 230
- ^ Ian Allan Pubs., The Balkans and North Africa 1941-42 (Blitzkrieg Series #4), p.13
- ^ Reflections on the 65th Anniversary of the day Greece answered no and once again changed the course of history, by Chris P. Tomarasaccessed October 10, 2006
- ^ Fafalios and Hadjipateras, P. 157
- ^ Lamb (1998), pp. 291-292
- ^ De Felice (1990), p. 107
- ^ Buell (2002), p. 37
- ^ Knox (2000), p.79
- ^ De Felice (1990), pp. 87-88
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External links
- Photos of the initial Italian offensive in Epirus
- Commando Supremo: Invasion of Greece 28 October - Italian Order of battle
- Commando Supremo: Italian Army
- Greece: October 1940 (in Italian)
- Greece of OXI (Greek: Η Ελλάς του ΟΧΙ)
- The Defence of Greece 1940-41 website
- Greco-Italian War (Serbian)
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