Blitzkrieg
Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France, blitzkrieg could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Blitzkrieg strategy has the inherent danger of the attacking force overextending its supply lines, and the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a determined foe who is willing and able to sacrifice territory for time in which to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front (as opposed to for example the Dutch who had no territory to sacrifice). Tank and vehicle production was a constant problem for Germany; indeed, late in the war many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks.[22] As the end of the war approached, Germany also experienced critical shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Anglo-American strategic bombing and blockade. Although production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft continued, they would be unable to fly for lack of fuel. What fuel there was went to panzer divisions, and even then they were not able to operate normally. Of those Tiger tanks lost against the United States Army, nearly half of them were abandoned for lack of fuel.[23]
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Influence
Blitzkrieg's widest influence was within the Western Allied leadership of the war, some of whom drew inspiration from the Wehrmacht's approach. United States General George S. Patton emphasized fast pursuit, the use of an armored spearhead to effect a breakthrough, and then cutting off and disrupting enemy forces prior to their flight. In his comments of the time, he credited Guderian and Rommel's work, notably Infantry Attacks, for this insight. He also put into practice the idea attributed to cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest, "git thar fustest with the mostest" (get there first, with the most forces).
Blitzkrieg also has had some influence on subsequent militaries and doctrines. The Israel Defense Forces may have been influenced by blitzkrieg in creating a military of flexible armored spearheads and close air support.[24] The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 is also considered as a modern example of blitzkrieg-style assault by Indian forces that ended in a swift defeat of Pakistan, within a fortnight.[25] The 1990s United States theorists of "Shock and awe" claim blitzkrieg as a subset of strategies which they term "rapid dominance".
It may also be argued that Napoleon Bonaparte used some form of blitzkrieg tactic when conquering Europe a century prior to the invasion of Poland by Adolf Hitler.
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Changing interpretation
Beginning in the 1970s, the interpretation of blitzkrieg, particularly with respect to the Second World War, has undergone a shift in the historical community. John Ellis described the shift:
Our perception of land operations in the Second World War has...been distorted by an excessive emphasis upon the hardware employed. The main focus of attention has been the tank and the formations that employed it, most notably the (German) panzer divisions. Despite the fact that only 40 of the 520 German divisions that saw combat were panzer divisions (there were also an extra 24 motorised/panzergrenadier divisions), the history of German operations has consistently almost exclusively been written largely in terms of blitzkrieg and has concentrated almost exclusively upon the exploits of the mechanized formations. Even more misleadingly, this presentation of ground combat as a largely armored confrontation has been extended to cover Allied operations, so that in the popular imagination the exploits of the British and Commonwealth Armies, with only 11 armored divisions out of 73 (that saw combat), and of the Americans in Europe, with only 16 out of 59, are typified by tanks sweeping around the Western Desert or trying to keep up with Patton in the race through Sicily and across northern France. Of course, these armored forces did play a somewhat more important role in operations than the simple proportions might indicate, but it still has to be stressed that they in no way dominated the battlefield or precipitated the evolution of completely new modes of warfare.[26]
Ellis, as well as Zaloga in his study of the Polish Campaign in 1939, points to the effective use of other arms such as artillery and aerial firepower as equally important to the success of German (and later, Allied) operations. Panzer operations in Russia failed to provide decisive results; Leningrad never fell despite an entire Panzer Group being assigned to take it, nor did Moscow. In 1942, panzer formations overstretched at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and what successes did take place – such as Manstein at Kharkov or Krivoi Rog – were of local significance only.
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See also
- AirLand Battle, blitzkrieg-like doctrine of US Army in 1980s
- Armored warfare
- Attrition warfare
- The Blitz, the Luftwaffe air raids on London
- Combined arms
- Deep Battle, the period Soviet concept of warfare
- Maneuver warfare, battle doctrine of speed and strategic movement
- Methodical Battle, the period French concept of warfare
- Rush (computer and video games), an RTS strategy influenced by blitzkrieg
- Shock and Awe, the 21st century American military doctrine
- Vernichtungsgedanken, or 'annihilation thoughts', one of blitzkrieg predecessors
- Mission-type tactics, tactical battle doctrine of delegation and initiative stimulation
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References
- ^ Frieser, K.H. 'The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West'
- ^ "Blitzkrieger" in TIME Vol. XXXIV No. 13, 25 September 1939. http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,761969,00.html
- ^ James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 37
- ^ Corum, op. cit., 23.
- ^ Corum, op. cit., 7.
- ^ Argued by Corum, Edwards, and House. This is not to include theories which were not adopted as actual doctrine, on which there are varied views.
- ^ The Roots of Blitzkrieg, James Corum, 1992, p39
- ^ Roger Edwards, Panzer: A Revolution in Warfare, 1939–1945 (London: Brockhampton Press, 1998), 23.
- ^ Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911–1918, Vol. 2, Odhams Press, UK.
- ^ Guderian's remarks are from an unnamed article published in the National Union of German Officers, 15 October 1937 as quoted in Panzer Leader, pp. 39–46. Italics removed — the quoted sections are all italics in the original.
- ^ Heinz Guderian, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon, Panzer Leader (New York: De Capo Press, 2002), 46. See also Edwards, op. cit., 24.
- ^ Panzer Leader, page 20'
- ^ Edwards, op. cit., 145.
- ^ Edwards, op. cit., 25.
- ^ Pitt, Barrie. The Second World War. (BPC Publishing 1966)
- ^ Cooper, Matthew. The German Army 1939–1945: Its Political and Military Failure 1976
- ^ Cooper, Ibid.
- ^ Ellis, John. Brute Force (Viking Penguin, 1990)
- ^ Zaloga, Steven and Majej. The Polish Campaign 1939 (Hippocrene Books, 1985)
- ^ Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1996, Penguin London, p94
- ^ Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941–45 (New York: Quill, 1965), 78.
- ^ Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's, 2000), 34
- ^ Charles Winchester, “The Demodernization of the German Army in World War 2”, Osprey Publishing. http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content2.php/cid=68
- ^ Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. (U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 1984; reprint University Press of the Pacific, 2002). http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/House/House.asp
- ^ Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198200978 pp802
- ^ Ellis, John. Brute Force 1990.
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Further reading
- Chrisp, Peter. (1991) Blitzkrieg!, Witness History Series. New York: Bookwright Press. ISBN 0531183734.
- Citino, Robert Michael. (1999) The Path to Blitzkrieg : Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1555877141.
- Citino, Robert Michael. (2002) Quest for Decisive Victory : From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899-1940, Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700611762.
- Condell, Bruce, and David T. Zabecki. (2001) On the German Art of War : Truppenführung, The Art of War. Boulder: L. Rienner. ISBN 1555879969.
- Cooper, Matthew. (1997) The German Army, 1933-1945 : Its Political and Military Failure. Lantham: Scarborough House. ISBN 0812885198.
- Corum, James S. (1992) The Roots of Blitzkrieg : Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform, Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 070060541X.
- Deighton, Len. (1980) Blitzkrieg : From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk. New York: Knopf. ISBN 0394510208.
- Doughty, Robert A. (1990) The Breaking Point : Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Hamden: Archon Books. ISBN 0208022813.
- Edwards, Roger. (1989) Panzer, a Revolution in Warfare : 1939-1945. London/New York: Arms and Armour. ISBN 0853689326.
- Frieser, Karl-Heinz. (1995) Blitzkrieg-Legende : Der Westfeldzug 1940, Operationen des Zweiten Weltkrieges. München: R. Oldenbourg. ISBN 3486561243.
- Frieser, Karl-Heinz, and John T. Greenwood. (2005) The Blitzkrieg Legend : The 1940 Campaign in the West. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591142946.
- Guderian, Heinz. (1996) Panzer Leader. New York: Da Capo Press. ISBN 0306806894.
- House, Jonathan M. (2001) Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700610812 | 0700610987
- Manstein, Erich von, and Anthony G. Powell. (2004) Lost Victories. St. Paul: Zenith Press. ISBN 0760320543.
- Megargee, Geoffrey P. (2000) Inside Hitler's High Command, Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700610154.
- Stolfi, R. H. S. (1991) Hitler's Panzers East : World War II Reinterpreted. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0806124008.
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External links
- House, Jonathan M. (1985) Toward Combined Arms Warfare : A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization. Fort Leavenworth/Washington: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- Sinesi, Michael Patrick (2001) Modern Bewegungskrieg: German Battle Doctrine, 1920-1940. Thesis submitted to The Faculty of Columbian School of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts; directed by Andrew Zimmerman, Assistant Professor of History. (Microsoft Word document).
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