Battle of Moscow
On November 15, 1941, German tank armies began their offensive towards Klin, where no Soviet reserves were available due to Stalin's wish to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk, which had forced the relocation of all available reserves forces further south. Initial German attacks split the front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th.[45] Several days of intense combat followed. As Zhukov recalls in his memoirs, "The enemy, ignoring the casualties, was making frontal assaults, willing to get to Moscow by any means necessary."[47] Despite the Wehrmacht's efforts, the multilayered defense reduced Soviet casualties as the Soviet 16th Army slowly retreated and constantly harassed the German divisions trying to make their way through the fortifications.
The Third Panzer Army finally captured Klin after heavy fighting on November 24, 1941, and by November 25, 1941, Solnechnogorsk as well. Soviet resistance was still strong, and the outcome of the battle was by no means certain. Reportedly, Stalin asked Zhukov whether Moscow could be successfully defended and ordered him to "speak honestly, like a communist." Zhukov replied that it was possible, but that reserves were desperately needed.[47] By November 28, the German 7th Panzer Division had seized a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal — the last major obstacle before Moscow — and stood less than 35 kilometers from the Kremlin;[45] but a powerful counterattack by the 1st Shock Army drove them back across the canal.[48] Just northwest of Moscow, the Wehrmacht reached Krasnaya Polyana, little more than 20 kilometers from Moscow;[49] German officers were able to make out some of the major buildings of the Soviet capital through their field glasses. However, both Soviet and German forces were severely depleted, sometimes having only 150 to 200 riflemen (a company's full strength) left in a regiment.[45]
In the south, near Tula, hostilities resumed on November 18, 1941, with the Second Panzer army trying to encircle the city.[45] The German forces involved were extremely battered from previous fighting, and still had no winter clothing. As a result, initial German progress was only 5 to 10 km (3 to 6 mi) per day, making chances of success "less than certain" according to Guderian.[50] Moreover, it exposed the German tank armies to flanking attacks from the Soviet 49th and 50th armies, located near Tula, further slowing the advance. However, Guderian was still able to pursue the offensive, spreading his forces in a star-like attack, taking Stalinogorsk on November 22, 1941 and surrounding a Soviet rifle division stationed there. On November 26, German panzers approached Kashira, a city controlling a major highway to Moscow. In response, a violent Soviet counterattack was launched the following day. General Belov's 2nd Cavalry Corps, supported by hastily assembled formations which included 173rd Rifle Division, 9th Tank Brigade, two separate tank battalions, and training and militia units,[51] halted the German advance near Kashira.[52] The Germans were driven back in early December, securing the southern approach to the city.[53] Tula itself held, protected by fortifications and determined defenders, both soldiers and civilians. In the south, the Wehrmacht never got close to the capital.
Due to the resistance on both the northern and southern sides of Moscow, the Wehrmacht attempted, on December 1, 1941, a direct offensive from the west, along the Minsk-Moscow highway near the city of Naro-Fominsk. However, this attack had only limited tank support and was forced to assault extensive Soviet defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the Soviet 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks staged by the 33rd Army, the German offensive was driven back four days later,[45] with the Germans losing 10,000 men and several dozen tanks.[54]
By early December, the temperatures, so far relatively mild by Russian standards,[55] dropped as low as twenty to fifty degrees Celsius below zero, freezing German troops, who still had no winter clothing, and German vehicles, which were not designed for such severe weather. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers.[56] Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell[56] and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use.
The Axis offensive on Moscow stopped. As Guderian wrote in his journal, "the offensive on Moscow failed…. We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on December 5, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."[57]
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Soviet counteroffensive
Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves left and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred fresh divisions from Siberia and the Far East, relying on intelligence from his spy, Richard Sorge, which indicated that Japan would not attack the Soviet Union. The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December,[56] when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin.[58] However, even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men,[55] only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points.[56] On December 5, 1941, the counteroffensive started on the Kalinin Front. After two days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Krasnaya Polyana and several other cities in the immediate vicinity of Moscow.[17]
The same day, Hitler signed his directive number 39, ordering the Wehrmacht to assume a defensive stance on the whole front. However, German troops were unable to organize a solid defense at their present locations and were forced to pull back to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that discussions with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram von Richthofen took place the same day, and both commanders agreed that the current front line could not be held.[59] On December 14, Franz Halder and Günther von Kluge finally gave permission for a limited withdrawal to the west of the Oka river, without Hitler's approval.[60] On December 20, 1941, during a meeting with German senior officers, Hitler cancelled the withdrawal and ordered his soldiers to defend every patch of ground, "digging trenches with howitzer shells if needed."[61] Guderian protested, pointing out that losses from cold were actually greater than combat losses and that winter equipment was held by traffic ties in Poland.[62] Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on defending the existing lines, and Guderian was dismissed by Christmas, along with generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th Panzers and 9th Army, respectively. Fedor von Bock was also dismissed, officially for "medical reasons."[63] Walther von Brauchitsch, Hitler's commander-in-chief, had been removed even earlier, on December 19, 1941.[64]
Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued; in the north, Klin and Kalinin were liberated on December 15 and December 16, as the Kalinin Front drove west. The Soviet front commander, General Konev, attempted to envelop Army Group Center, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on December 16, 1941. The Luftwaffe was reinforced, as Hitler saw it as the only hope to "save" the situation. Two Kampfgruppen units (II./KG 4 and II./KG 30) arrived from refitting in Germany, whilst four Transportgruppen with a strength of 102 Junkers Ju 52 transports were deployed from Luftflotte 4 to evacuate surrounded Heer units and improve the supply line to the front-line forces. It was a last minute effort and it worked. The German air arm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army Group Centre. Despite the Luftwaffe's best efforts Soviet air superiority had contributed enormously to the Red Army's victory at Moscow. Between the 17 December and 22 December the Luftwaffe destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks around Tula, hampering the Red Army's pursuit of the German Army[65]. In the center, however, progress was much slower, and Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on December 26, Kaluga on December 28, and Maloyaroslavets on January 2, after ten days of violent action.[17] Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on January 7, 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 100 to 250 km (60 to 150 mi) from Moscow. This victory provided an important boost for Soviet morale, with the Wehrmacht suffering its first defeat. Having failed to vanquish the Soviet Union in one quick strike, Germany now had to prepare for a prolonged struggle. Operation Barbarossa had failed.
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Aftermath
- See also: Battles of Rzhev
The Red Army's winter counter-offensive drove the Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still considered to be threatened, with the front line still relatively close. Because of this, the Moscow direction remained a priority for Stalin, who initially appeared to be in shock due to the initial German success[66]. In particular, the initial Soviet advance was unable to level the Rzhev salient, held by several divisions of Army Group Center. Immediately after the Moscow counter-offensive, a series of Soviet attacks (the Battles of Rzhev) were attempted against the salient, each time with heavy losses on both sides. Soviet losses are estimated to be between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men, and German losses between 300,000 and 450,000 men. By early 1943, however, the Wehrmacht had to disengage from the salient as the whole front was moving west. Nevertheless, the Moscow front was not finally secured until October 1943, when Army Group Center was decisively repulsed from the Smolensk landbridge and from the left shore of the upper Dnieper at the end of the Second Battle of Smolensk.
Furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow, Hitler dismissed his commander-in-chief, Walther von Brauchitsch, on December 19, 1941, and took personal charge of the Wehrmacht,[64] effectively taking control of all military decisions and setting most experienced German officers against him. Additionally, Hitler surrounded himself with staff officers with little or no recent combat experience. As Guderian wrote in his memoirs, "This created a cold (chill) in our relations, a cold (chill) that could never be eliminated afterwards."[67] This increased Hitler's distrust of his senior officers and ultimately proved fatal to the Wehrmacht. Germany now faced the prospect of a war of attrition, something it was not prepared for. Overall the battle was a stinging defeat for the Axis, though not necessarily a crushing one, and it ended German hopes for a quick and decisive victory over the Soviet Union.
For the first time since June 1941, Soviet forces had stopped the Germans and driven them back. This resulted in Stalin becoming overconfident and deciding to further expand the offensive. On January 5, 1942, during a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin announced that he was planning a general spring counteroffensive, which would be staged simultaneously near Moscow, Leningrad and in southern Russia. This plan was accepted over Zhukov's objections.[68] However, low Red Army reserves and Wehrmacht tactical skill led to a bloody stalemate near Rhzev, known as the "Rzhev meat grinder," and to a string of Red Army defeats, such as the Second Battle of Kharkov, the failed elimination of the Demyansk pocket, and the encirclement of General Vlasov's army near Leningrad in a failed attempt to lift the siege of the city. Ultimately, these failures would lead to a successful German offensive in the south and to the Battle of Stalingrad.
Nevertheless, the defense of Moscow became a symbol of Soviet resistance against the invading Axis forces. To commemorate the battle, Moscow was awarded the title of "Hero City" in 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day.[17]
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Casualties
Both German and Soviet casualties during the battle of Moscow have been a subject of debate, as various sources provide somewhat different estimates. Not all historians agree on what should be considered the "Battle of Moscow" in the timeline of World War II. While the start of the battle is usually regarded as the beginning of Operation Typhoon on September 30, 1941 (or sometimes on October 2, 1941), there are two different dates for the end of the offensive. In particular, some sources (such as Erickson[69] and Glantz[70]) exclude the Rzhev offensive from the scope of the battle, considering it as a distinct operation and making the Moscow offensive "stop" on January 7, 1942 — thus lowering the number of casualties. Other historians, who include the Rzhev and Vyazma operations in the scope of the battle (thus making the battle end in May 1942), give higher casualty numbers.[17][63] Since the Rzhev operation started on January 8, 1942, with no pause after the previous counteroffensive, such a stance is understandable.
There are also significant differences in figures from various sources. John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, gives a figure of 653,924 Soviet casualties between October 1941 and January 1942.[69] Glantz, in his book When Titans Clashed, gives a figure of 658,279 for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the winter counteroffensive until January 7, 1942.[70] The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, published in 1973–1978, estimates 400,000 German casualties by January, 1942.[63] Another estimate available is provided in the Moscow Encyclopedia, published in 1997; its authors, based on various sources, give a figure of 145,000 German and 900,000 Soviet casualties for the defensive phase, along with 103,000 German and 380,000 Soviet casualties for the counteroffensive until January 7, 1942. With many of the Soviet causualties being men captured.[17] Therefore, total casualties between September 30, 1941, and January 7, 1942, are estimated to be between 248,000 and 400,000 for the Wehrmacht (GSE / Moscow encyclopedia estimate) and between 650,000 and 1,280,000 for the Red Army (Erickson / Moscow encyclopedia estimate).
The Battle of Moscow is listed among the most lethal battles in world history.
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Footnotes
- ^ Bergström 2007 p.90.
- ^ Williamson 1983, p.132.
- ^ Both Sources use Luftwaffe records. The often quoted figures of 900-1,300 do not correspond with recorded Luftwaffe strength returns. Sources: Prien, J./Stremmer, G./Rodeike, P./ Bock, W. Die Jagdfliegerverbande der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945, Teil 6/I and II; U.S National Archives, German Orders of Battle, Statistics of Quater Years.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Bergström 2007 p.90.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p. 111.
- ^ Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Memoirs of a soldier), Smolensk, Rusich, 1999, p. 229.
- ^ a b Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1973–1978, entry "Battle of Smolensk"
- ^ a b Guderian, p. 272.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 267–9.
- ^ A.M. Vasilevsky, The matter of my whole life, Moscow, Poitizdat, 1978, p. 134.
- ^ Marshal G.K. Zhukov, Memoirs, Moscow, Olma-Press, 2002, p. 352.
- ^ Zhukov, p. 353.
- ^ Vasilevsky, p. 135.
- ^ Guderian, p. 305.
- ^ Hitler, in "Völkischer Beobachter", October 10, 1941.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Moscow Encyclopedia, ed. Great Russian Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1997, entry "Battle of Moscow"
- ^ Bergstöm 2007, p. 90.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 307–9.
- ^ Guderian, p. 307
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.118.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.90-91.
- ^ Vasilevsky, p. 139.
- ^ a b c d e f Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "Viaz'ma and Briansk", pp. 74 ff.
- ^ Vasilevsky, p. 138.
- ^ a b c Vasilevsky, p. 139.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.91.
- ^ Guderian, p. 316.
- ^ Guderian, p. 318.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.91.
- ^ Plocher 1968, p.231.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.91.
- ^ Geoffrey Jukes, The Second World War — The Eastern Front 1941–1945, Osprey, 2002, ISBN 1-84176-391-8, p. 29.
- ^ Jukes, p. 31.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 10.
- ^ Plocher 1968, p.231
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.93
- ^ Jukes, p. 32.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 17.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 18.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 22.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 24.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 329–30.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 23–5.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Glantz, chapter 6, sub-ch. "To the Gates", pp. 80ff.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 27.
- ^ a b Zhukov, tome 2, p. 28.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 30.
- ^ Guderian, p. 345.
- ^ Guderian, p. 340.
- ^ Erickson, 'The Road to Stalingrad,' p.260
- ^ A.P. Belov, Moscow is behind us, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1963, p. 97.
- ^ Belov, p. 106.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 32.
- ^ a b Glantz, ch.6, subchapter "December counteroffensive", pp. 86ff.
- ^ a b c d Jukes, p. 32.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 354–5.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, p. 37.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 353–5.
- ^ Guderian, p. 354.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 360–1.
- ^ Guderian, pp. 363–4.
- ^ a b c Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1973–78, entry "Battle of Moscow 1941–42"
- ^ a b Guderian, p. 359.
- ^ Bergström 2007, p.112-113.
- ^ Planning for war: the Red Army and the catastrophe of 1941 Europe-Asia Studies, Dec, 1995 by Cynthia A. Roberts [1] "Marshal Georgii K. Zhukov, who had pressed Stalin on several occasions to alert and reinforce the army, nonetheless recalled the shock of the German attack when he noted that 'neither the defence commissariat, myself, my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov and K.A. Meretskov, nor the General Staff thought that the enemy could concentrate such a mass of ... forces and commit them on the first day...'"
- ^ Guderian, p. 365.
- ^ Zhukov, tome 2, pp. 43–4.
- ^ a b John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, table 12.4
- ^ a b Glantz, Table B
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References
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- Braithwaite, Rodric. Moscow 1941: A City and Its People at War. London: Profile Books Ltd, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1-86197-759-X).
- Collection of legislative acts related to State Awards of the USSR (1984), Moscow, ed. Izvestia.
- Moscow Encyclopedia, ed. Great Russian Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1997, entry "Battle of Moscow"
- Belov, Pavel Alekseevich (1963). Za nami Moskva. Moscow: Voenizdat.
- Bergström, Christer (2007). Barbarossa - The Air Battle: July-December 1941. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.
- Erickson, John; Dilks, David (1994). Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 0-7486-0504-5.
- Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1995). When Titans clashed: how the Red Army stopped Hitler. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 0-7006-0717-X.
- Guderian, Heinz (1951). Erinnerungen eines Soldaten. Heidelberg: Vowinckel.
- Jukes, Geoffrey (2002). The Second World War: The Eastern Front 1941–1945. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-391-8.
- Nagorski, Andrew (2007). The Greatest Battle: Stalin, Hitler, and the Desperate Struggle for Moscow That Changed the Course of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0743281101.
- Plocher, Hermann (1968). Luftwaffe versus Russia, 1941. New York: USAF: Historical Division, Arno Press.
- Prokhorov, A. M. (ed.) (1973–1978). Great Soviet Encyclopedia. New York: Macmillan.
- Reinhardt, Klaus. Moscow: The Turning Point? The Failure of Hitler's Strategy in the Winter of 1941–42. Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992 (hardback, ISBN 0-85496-695-1).
- Sokolovskii, Vasilii Danilovich (1964). Razgrom Nemetsko-Fashistskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi (with map album). Moscow: VoenIzdat. LCCN: 65-54443.
- Vasilevsky, A. M. (1981). Lifelong cause. Moscow: Progress. ISBN 0-7147-1830-0.
- Williamson, Murray (1983). Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945. United States Government Printing. ISBN 978-9997393487
- Zhukov, G. K. (1971). The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov. London: Cape. ISBN 0-224-61924-1.
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External links
- serpukhov.ru — The Moscow battle.
- Battle of Moscow 1941 + maps
- Moscow Attacked! — Free/educational Battle of Moscow boardgame.
- Armchair General/Maps 1941/Western Direction/The Moscow Battle — Excellent maps down to brigade level. For the Russians, 49A = 49th Army, cd = rifle division, kd = cavalry division, tbp = tank brigade, etc.
- WW2DB: Battle of Moscow
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