When Halsey turned Task Force 34 southwards at 11:15 he detached a task group (of four of its cruisers and nine of its destroyers) under Rear Admiral DuBose, and reassigned this to Task Force 38. At 14:15 Mitscher ordered DuBose to pursue the remnants of the Japanese Northern Force. His cruisers finished off the light carrier Chiyoda at around 17:00, and at 20:59 his ships sank the destroyer Hatsuzuki after a very stubborn fight. (Morison 1956).

When Admiral Ozawa learned of the deployment of DuBose's relatively weak task group he ordered the battleships Ise and Hyūga to turn southwards and attack it. However, the battleships failed to locate DuBose's group - which would (like those of Badger's Task Group 34.5 had it succeeded in intercepting Kurita's force) have been heavily outgunned. Halsey's withdrawal of all six of Lee's battleships in his forlorn and belated attempt to assist Seventh Fleet had now, absurdly, rendered Task Force 38 vulnerable to a surface counterattack by the Northern Force.

At about 23:10 the American submarine Jallao torpedoed and sank the light cruiser Tama of Ozawa's force. This was the last act of the Battle of Cape Engano, and - apart from some final air strikes on the retreating Japanese forces on 26 October - the conclusion of the Battle for Leyte Gulf.

(Woodward 1947, Fuller 1956, Morison 1956, Cutler 2001).

[

Criticism of Halsey

Halsey was criticized for his decision to take Task Force 34 north in pursuit of Ozawa, and for failing to detach it when Kinkaid first appealed for help. A piece of US Navy slang for Halsey's actions is 'Bull's Run', a phrase combining Halsey's newspaper nickname "Bull" (in the US Navy he was known as 'Bill' Halsey) with an allusion to the Battle of Bull Run in the American Civil War.

In his dispatch after the battle, Halsey justified the decision as follows:

"Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn.

I believed that the Center Force had been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet."

(Morison 1956 - emphasis added by contributor).

Halsey also argued that he had feared that leaving Task Force 34 to defend the strait without carrier support would have left it vulnerable to attack from land-based aircraft, while leaving one of the fast carrier groups behind to cover the battleships would have significantly reduced the concentration of air power going north to strike Ozawa.

However, Morison states that Admiral Lee told him that he would have been fully prepared for the battleships to cover San Bernardino Strait without any carrier support. (Morison 1956).

Moreover, if Halsey had been in proper communication with Seventh Fleet it would have been entirely practicable for the escort carriers of Task Force 77 to provide adequate air cover for Task Force 34 - a much easier matter than it would be for those escort carriers to defend themselves against the onslaught of Kurita's heavy ships.

It may be argued that the fact that Halsey was aboard one of the battleships, and "would have had to remain behind" with Task Force 34 (while the bulk of his fleet charged northwards to attack the Japanese carriers) may have contributed to this decision. However, it would have been perfectly feasible (and logical) to have taken one or both of Third Fleet's two fastest battleships (Iowa and/or New Jersey) with the carriers in the pursuit of Ozawa, while leaving the rest of the Battle Line off San Bernardino Strait. (Indeed, Halsey's original plan for the composition of Task Force 34 was that it would contain only four, not all six, of the Third Fleet's battleships). Therefore, to guard San Bernardino Strait with a powerful battleship force would not have been incompatible with Halsey's personally going north aboard the New Jersey.

It does seem likely that Halsey was strongly influenced by his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Robert "Mick" Carney, who was also wholeheartedly in favour of taking all Third Fleet's available forces northwards to attack the Japanese carrier force.

Clifton Sprague, commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar, was later bitterly critical of Halsey's decision, and of his failure to clearly inform Kinkaid and Seventh Fleet that their northern flank was no longer protected:

In the absence of any information that this exit [of the San Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without ample warning.

Regarding Halsey's failure to turn Task Force 34 southwards when Seventh Fleet's first calls for assistance off Samar were received, Morison writes:

If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Center Force ... Apart from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and completed the destruction of Center Force.

Instead, as Morison also observes:

The mighty gunfire of the Third Fleet's Battle Line, greater than that of the whole Japanese Navy, was never brought into action except to finish off one or two crippled light ships. (Morison 1956, pp. 336-7 – Emphasis added by contributor)

(Note - Task Group 34.5 in fact only finished off the straggling destroyer Nowaki, and this was not achieved by the battleships, but rather by their accompanying cruisers and destroyers) (Source: US Naval Historical Center http://www.history.navy.mil/).

Perhaps the most telling comment is made laconically by Vice Admiral Lee in his action report as Commander of Task Force 34 -

No battle damage was incurred nor inflicted on the enemy by vessels while operating as Task Force Thirty-Four.

Task Force 34 Action Report: 6 October 1944 - 3 November 1944

(Main sources for this section: Woodward 1947, Fuller 1956, Morison 1956, Cutler 2001, Hornfischer 2004).

[

Aftermath

The battle of Leyte Gulf secured the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army on Leyte against attack from the sea. However, much hard fighting would be required before the island was completely in Allied hands at the end of December 1944: the Battle of Leyte on land was fought in parallel with an air and sea campaign in which the Japanese reinforced and resupplied their troops on Leyte while the Allies attempted to interdict them and establish air-sea superiority for a series of amphibious landings in Ormoc Bay — engagements collectively referred to as the Battle of Ormoc Bay. (Morison 1956).

The Imperial Japanese Navy had suffered its greatest loss since the Meiji Restoration. Its failure to dislodge the Allied invaders from Leyte meant the inevitable loss of the Philippines, which in turn meant that Japan would be all but cut off from her occupied territories in Southeast Asia. These territories provided resources which were vital to Japan, in particular the oil needed for her ships and aircraft, and this problem was compounded because the shipyards, and sources of manufactured goods such as ammunition, were in Japan itself. Finally, the loss of Leyte opened the way for the invasion of the Ryukyu Islands in 1945. (Fuller 1956, Morison 1956).

The major surface ships had returned to their bases to languish, entirely or almost entirely inactive, for the remainder of the war. The only major operation by its surface ships between the Battle for Leyte Gulf and the Japanese surrender was the disastrous and doomed sortie in April 1945 (part of Operation Ten-Go), in which the battleship Yamato and her escorts were destroyed by American carrier aircraft.

The first use of kamikaze aircraft took place following the Leyte landings. A kamikaze hit the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia on 21 October. Organized suicide attacks by the "Special Attack Force" began on 25 October during the closing phase of the Battle off Samar, causing the destruction of the escort carrier USS St. Lo.

J.F.C. Fuller, in his 'The Decisive Battles of the Western World', writes of the outcome of Leyte Gulf:

The Japanese fleet had [effectively] ceased to exist, and, except by land-based aircraft, their opponents had won undisputed command of the sea.

When Admiral Ozawa was questioned . . after the war he replied 'After this battle the surface forces became strictly auxiliary, so that we relied on land forces, special [Kamikaze] attack, and air power . . there was no further use assigned to surface vessels, with the exception of some special ships'.

And Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, said that he realised that 'the defeat at Leyte 'was tantamount to the loss of the Philippines' . .

As for the larger significance of the battle, he said ' I felt that it was the end .' (Fuller 1956).

[

Notes

[

References

• Cutler, Thomas (2001). The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-243-9. 
• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X. 
• Drea, Edward J. (1998). "Leyte: Unanswered Questions", In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-1708-0. 
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1. 
• Field, James A. (1947). The Japanese at Leyte Gulf;: The Sho operation. Princeton University Press. ASIN B0006AR6LA. 
• Friedman, Kenneth (2001). Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Presidio Press. ISBN 0-89141-756-7. 
• Fuller, J.F.C. (1956). The Decisive Battles of the Western World - Volume III. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode. ISBN10: 1135317909. 
• Hornfischer, James D. (2004). The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-80257-7. 
• Hoyt, Edwin P.; Thomas H Moorer (Introduction) (2003). The Men of the Gambier Bay: The Amazing True Story of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Lyons Press. ISBN 1-58574-643-6. 
• Lacroix, Eric; Linton Wells (1997). Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-311-3. 
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1956 (reissue 2004)). Leyte, June 1944-January 1945, vol. 12 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A.: University of Illinois Press; Reprint edition. ISBN 0-252-07063-1. 
• Potter, E. B. (2005). Admiral Arleigh Burke. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-692-5. 
• Potter, E. B. (2003). Bull Halsey. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-691-7. 
• Sauer, Howard (1999). The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait. Glencannon Press. ISBN 1-889901-08-3. 
• Stewart, Adrian (1979). The Battle of Leyte Gulf. Hale. ISBN 0709175442. 
• Thomas, Evan (2006). Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-7432-5221-7. 
• Vego, Milan N. (2006). Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied And Japanese Plans, Preparations, And Execution. US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1557508852. 
• Willmott, H. P. (2005). The Battle Of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. Indiana University Press. ISBN 0-253-34528-6. 
• Woodward, C. Vann (1947 (reissue 2007)). The Battle for Leyte Gulf. Skyhorse Publishing. ISBN 1602391947. 

[

External links

• United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) - Interrogations of Japanese Officials
• Animated History of The Battle of Leyte Gulf
• Battle Experience: Battle for Leyte Gulf [Cominch Secret Information Bulletin No. 22]
• Task Force 34 Action Report: 6 October 1944 - 3 November 1944 (VAdm Lee)
• Task Force 77 Action Report: Battle of Leyte Gulf (VAdm Kinkaid)
• "Turkey Trots to Water" — detailed description of the battle from battleship.org
• Orders of battle: Sibuyan Sea, Surigao Strait, Cape Engaño, Samar.
• The Australian contingent / sixtieth anniversary of the battle
• 'Glorious Death: The Battle of Leyte Gulf' by Tim Lanzendörfer
• battle-of-leyte-gulf.com
• The Battle Off Samar — Taffy III at Leyte Gulf by Robert Jon Cox
• Return to the Philippines: public domain documents from ibiblio.org
• The Battle for Leyte Gulf Revisited by Irwin J. Kappes
• Japan's TA-Operation: A Blueprint for Disaster by Irwin J. Kappes
• 'Loss of the USS Princeton (CVL-23), 24 October 1944' - United States' Naval Historical Center

[

Audio/visual media

• Lost Evidence of the Pacific: The Battle of Leyte Gulf. History Channel TV
• Dogfights: Death of the Japanese Navy. History Channel. TV
• Battle 360: Battle of Leyte Gulf. History Channel. TV

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